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Over the last generation, the Supreme Court has dramatically revitalized the
mens rea requirement for federal crimes. The "guilty mind" requirement now
aspires to exempt all "innocent"1 (or morally blameless) conduct from punishment
and restrict criminal statutes to conduct that is "inevitably nefarious."'2 When a
literal interpretation of a federal criminal statute could encompass "innocent"
behavior, courts stand ready to impose heightened mens rea requirements designed
to exempt all such behavior from punishment. The goal of current federal mens rea
doctrine, in other words, is nothing short of protecting moral innocence against the
stigma and penalties of criminal punishment.
Although the scholarly community has been quick to embrace the goal of
innocence-protection,3 this Essay argues that federal mens rea doctrine rests on an
unduly narrow conception of "innocence." To conceive of innocence-protection as
merely preventing conviction for morally blameless conduct, as current doctrine
does, is to miss an important dimension of moral culpability-namely, proportion-
ality, or the idea that the punishment must be tailored to the offender's level of
blameworthiness. The objection to punishing blameless acts is that the actor is not
morally deserving of the blame that it is uniquely the province of the criminal law
to impart. The same misalignment of blame and punishment occurs when blame-
worthy acts receive disproportionately severe punishment.
Consequently, if the goal really is to protect "innocence" by ruling out morally
undeserved punishment, mens rea doctrine must do more than guarantee a modi-
cum of moral blameworthiness as a precondition to punishment. It must also
* Professor of Law and John V. Ray Research Professor, University of Virginia. For helpful comments and
suggestions, I am grateful to Robert Blakely, Richard Bonnie, Kim Forde-Mazrui, Nicole Gamett, John Jeffries,
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1. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,426 (1985); see also, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,269
(2000).
2. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv.
127, 145-52 (1997); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and
Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BuFF. CiLm. L. REv. 859, 882-904 (1999); John S. Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REv. 1021, 1057-1130 (1999).
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ensure that the acts which lead to criminal liability will be sufficiently blameworthy
to deserve the sanctions imposed by the substantive offense. Only then will
"innocence" truly be protected against criminal liability, and the traditional role of
mens rea fulfilled.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the Supreme Court's current
approach to mens rea, which equates "innocence" with "moral blamelessness."
Part II criticizes that narrow conception of "innocence." Mens rea has traditionally
served to prevent disproportional punishment as well as punishment of blameless
conduct, and the outcomes in recent mens rea cases are indefensible without
reference to the very proportionality considerations the cases treat as irrelevant.
Part III makes the case for "proportional mens rea," a proportionality-based
approach to mens rea selection. Proportional mens rea would provide proportional-
ity safeguards that are otherwise entirely lacking in substantive criminal law and,
as a practical matter, unavailable in constitutional law. Creating implied mens rea
requirements, where necessary to ensure proportional punishment, is not a judicial
usurpation of a legislative function. Rather, it is to take seriously the role that
courts play, under both constitutional and substantive criminal law, to ensure that
punishment "fits" the crime. Moreover, proportional mens rea would represent a
needed counterweight to prosecutorial behavior whereas current doctrine does not.
Given that federal prosecutors do not seek to charge morally blameless people,
mens rea doctrine aimed only at protecting moral blamelessness from punishment
will largely be redundant of prosecutorial discretion. Proportionality of punish-
ment, however, is a concern that federal prosecutors-bound by longstanding
Executive Branch mandates to seek the maximum supportable penalty in every
case and oppose lenient exercises of judicial sentencing discretion-routinely
ignore. Judicial mens rea selection, therefore, has a substantial contribution to
make to the achievement of proportionality of punishment.
I. INNOCENCE-PROTECTION AND MENS REA
Moral innocence was not always an important factor in federal mens rea
selection. For several generations, the Supreme Court treated the historic require-
ment of a "guilty mind" (or a morally culpable mental state) as the exception,
rather than the rule, in federal criminal law.4 In Morissette v. United States,5 the
Court held that a culpable mental state is required for the small category of crimes
derived from the common law but ominously stated that "quite contrary infer-
ences" may be warranted as to "offense[s] new to general law, for whose definition
the courts have no guidance except the Act.",6 The clear implication, seized upon in
4. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
280-81 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922).
5. 342 U.S. 246 (1956).
6. Id. at 262. Among these "new" offenses are regulatory crimes known as "public welfare offenses," which
dispense with mens rea as to one or more elements of the actus reus in the interest of the public welfare. Simply
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later cases,7 was that a culpable mental state may not be required for regulatory or
other crimes unknown to the common law.
In Liparota v. United States8 and subsequent cases,9 the Supreme Court em-
ployed an entirely different approach to mens rea. Under this approach, the goal of
the mens rea requirement is to protect "innocent" conduct from punishment. This
goal is accomplished by requiring a culpable mental state for all crimes, regardless
of their origin or status.
Staples v. United States'° exemplifies the new approach to mens rea. The case
involved a prosecution for possession of an unregistered machinegun, a crime
previously classified as a public welfare offense. Citing public-safety concerns, the
prosecution argued that conviction should be allowed as long as the defendant
knew the item he possessed was a gun of some kind. The Court disagreed, noting
that such a minimal mens rea requirement would allow prosecutors to convict the
"innocent" act of possessing guns that "traditionally have been widely accepted as
lawful possessions.""i
To exempt "innocent" instances of gun possession from the statute, Staples
demanded proof of a culpable mental state. To convict, the government must prove
that the defendant knew the "quasi-suspect character" of his "firearm" (in Staples's
case, its automatic-firing capability) that placed it outside of the category of guns
that can be lawfully possessed free of government regulation.12 Thus, far from
being limited to common law crimes, -the "guilty mind" requirement now applied
more broadly to regulatory crimes as well."3
stated, public welfare offenses require individuals who engage in activities that create generalized risks of harm to
the public at large to use special care to prevent those hams from materializing. See id. at 255-56.
7. See, e.g., Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (concluding that a culpable mental state is not required in the "expanding
regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare" and that common-law crimes
belong to a "different category").
8. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144
(1994).
10. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
11. Id. at 612. In declaring gun possession to be "innocent" conduct, the Court relied on the "long tradition of
widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country." Id. at 610; see also id. at 621 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in judgment) (faulting the government for "not tak[ing] adequate account of the 'widespread lawful
gun ownership' Congress and the States have allowed to persist in this country"). Given this tradition, the mere
fact that an item is a gun "cannot be said to put gun owners sufficiently on notice of the likelihood of regulation."
Id. at 612 (majority opinion).
12. Id.; see also id. at 619 (holding that "to obtain a conviction, the Government should have been required to
prove that petitioner knew of the features of his AR-I5 that brought it within the scope of the Act").
13. Id. at 612. Staples, of course, did not reject the concept of strict liability, which arises when one or more
elements of the actus reus require no mens rea at all. Indeed, even as construed in Staples, the possession offense
was a strict liability crime because, under Freed, no mens rea is required as to the unregistered status of the
firearm. See id. at 609. The fundamental insight of Staples is that strict liability, if properly limited, is not
inconsistent with the goal of innocence protection: mens rea can be safely dispensed with as to elements of the
crime that are not central to the blameworthiness of the prohibited act, provided that the remaining elements of the
crime supply the requisite blameworthiness (and hence notice). What makes the possession of weapons classified
20091
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The innocence-protection the Court desires is achieved by strategically adjust-
ing the mens rea in light of the nature of the prohibited act. Where the nature of the
prohibited act, as defined by Congress, is sufficient to guarantee that anyone con-
victed of the crime will be morally blameworthy, courts treat the legislative
definition of the crime as conclusive and do not impose heightened mens rea
requirements.1 4 If, however, the prohibited act is not "inevitably nefarious" 15 and
thus could potentially reach innocent conduct, courts adopt more stringent mens
rea requirements designed to exclude all innocent conduct from the crime's
reach. 16
Typically, as exemplified by Staples, innocence protection is achieved by
requiring knowledge of all the facts that make the defendant's conduct wrongful.
Although the Court perceived a threat to innocence protection in Staples, it did not
require proof that the defendant knew the legal definition of "firearm," much less
that it is illegal to possess unregistered "firearms." Instead, the Court required the
government to prove that the defendant knew the pertinent facts-namely, the
characteristics that brought his weapon within the statutory definition of "fire-
arm." 17
In many cases, full knowledge of the facts that make the defendant's conduct
illegal will prevent conviction for morally blameless conduct. Sometimes, how-
ever, knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense will fail to exclude all
"innocent" conduct from the reach of a criminal statute. These are situations of
incompletely defined crimes-situations where the crime, as legislatively defined,
fails to describe acts that citizens would expect to be considered wrongful. In these
as statutory "firearms" blameworthy is not that they are unregistered-after all, most dangerous items, and indeed
-most guns, need not be registered-but rather that they are the kind of weapons that traditionally could not be
lawfully possessed without strict government regulation. See id. at 611-12; Freed, 401 U.S. at 616 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting that the crime encompasses only "major weapons" as to which "the likelihood of
government regulation... is so great that anyone must be presumed to be aware of it"). The Court's insistence on
proof of a culpable mental state as to the nature of the "firearm" thus served to exclude innocent gun possession
from the crime, even though the weapon's unregistered status is a strict-liability element.
14. The relevant case here is Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). The issue in Bryan was whether
persons charged with "willfully violating" a federal firearms law have to know of the exact law they violated or
whether it is enough that they knew, in a generic sense, they were acting illegally. Because general knowledge of
illegality would be enough to guarantee moral culpability, the Court accepted the lesser, more generic showing as
sufficient. Id. at 194-96.
15. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
16. This is precisely what happened in Staples, as previously noted. See supra p. 4. Staples was not an outlier
in this regard; the Supreme Court has repeatedly responded to the danger that innocent conduct might result in
punishment by adopting heightened mens rea requirements. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544
U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (holding that, to be guilty of obstruction of justice as a "corrupt persuader," consciousness of
wrongdoing is required); Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144 (ruling that defendants cannot be convicted of evading
currency-transaction reporting requirements unless they knew such evasion is illegal); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426
(holding that food stamp fraud requires proof that the defendant knew he violated laws concerning permissible
uses of food stamps). For a comprehensive discussion of the key cases in this area, see Wiley, supra note 3, at
1034-53.
17. 511 U.S. at 619.
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situations, the mental culpability (and innocence protection) the Court demands
can only come from proof that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal.
The Court's commitment to innocence protection is most dramatically shown in
its cases making ignorance of the law a defense to particular crimes. The most
recent installment in this line of cases is Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States.1 8
Arthur Andersen was charged with "corruptly persuading" its employees to de-
stroy Enron-related documents with intent to cause those documents to be
withheld from federal investigators.19 Noting the prevalence and legitimacy of
document-retention policies in the business world and the fact that lawyers often
advise clients to withhold documents from investigators on privilege grounds, the
Court concluded that persuading others to withhold documents from a federal
investigation is "by itself innocuous" and "not inherently malign. 2° To ensure that
innocent "persuasion" cannot result in punishment, the Court required proof that
the "persuader" acted with "consciousness of wrongdoing. 21
As this brief survey of current mens rea doctrine suggests, the recent mens rea
cases have given rise to a dramatically different approach to mens rea in the federal
system. The Supreme Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined in terms that
guarantee a path to acquittal in substantive criminal law for morally blameless
conduct and has increasingly looked to the mental element of crimes to provide
this protection against punishment for "innocent" conduct. Thus, innocence-
protection has emerged both as the overarching goal of the mental element of
federal crimes and as the driving force behind federal mens rea selection.
II. WHAT IS "INNOCENCE"?
The Supreme Court, to date, has only grappled with one part of the innocence-
protection problem: avoiding punishment for innocent acts. Proportionality con-
cerns have no place in the mens rea analysis outlined by the Court. An act is either
"inevitably nefarious' 22 or not; if it is, then the act is not "innocent" and heightened
implied mens rea requirements are categorically ruled out. As a recent case
declares, "The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a
statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from
'otherwise innocent conduct.' 23 On this narrow view of innocence protection,
federal mens rea doctrine serves only to ensure that persons subject to conviction
18. 544 U.S. 696 (2000).
19. See id. at 702 (describing indictment of Arthur Andersen). "Corrupt persuasion" is a form of obstruction of
justice prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
20. Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 703-04.
21. Id. at 706. Arthur Andersen was hardly the first case in which the Court demanded consciousness of
wrongdoing in order to exclude innocent conduct from the reach of federal crimes. See Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994) ("structuring" cash transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991) (tax fraud); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (misuse of food stamps).
22. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144.
23. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (citations omitted).
20091
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
in federal court will have committed a minimally blameworthy act.
This is not the only possible understanding of the meaning of "innocence" and
of the normative aspirations of mens rea doctrine. Innocence-protection might
mean more than ensuring that punishment will not be imposed for morally
blameless conduct. On this broader view, the goal of mens rea would be to align
guilt and punishment with the moral blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct.
This conception of innocence-protection would give relevance to moral blamewor-
thiness along two axes instead of just one: blameworthiness would not only
determine who can and cannot be punished, but also how much punishment can be
imposed for a blameworthy act. Innocence-protection, as thus broadly construed,
would also aim to ensure that blameworthy acts will be punished in proportion to
their degree of blameworthiness.
This Part contends that the innocence-protection project will not be complete
until the Supreme Court explicitly adopts the broader view of innocence as the
basis of mens rea doctrine. The Court's limited, culpability-focused approach
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that mens rea has traditionally
performed in criminal law in achieving proportional punishment for blameworthy
acts. Unless corrected, the restrictive approach to mens rea selection will allow the
single greatest threat to innocence in the federal system--disproportionately
severe penalties-to go unaddressed.
A. Criminal Law Tradition and "Innocence"
The correctness of the broader conception of innocence-protection can be seen
by examining the various ways in which mens rea has traditionally operated to
delimit criminal liability. In some, mens rea serves to ensure that "normal"
persons, operating under normal circumstances, 24 will not be convicted of a crime
unless they committed a morally blameworthy act. In others, however, mens rea
serves to distinguish among the "guilty" by determining the extent of punishment
24. "Normal" persons are those who are not so gravely deficient in their ability to discern right from wrong as
to make it unfair to blame them for breaking the law. The law affords defenses, such as insanity and immaturity, to
excuse crimes by certain categories of "abnormal" persons, colorfully described by one commentator as "the very
young, the very crazy, and the severely mentally retarded." Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless:
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1521 (1992).
Even "normal" persons, however, can be confronted with abnormal situations in which they cannot fairly be
blamed for committing a crime. In such situations, commission of a crime might be morally appropriate or
"justified" (such as breaking into private property to save a life) or, in the case of crimes committed under duress
or as a result of entrapment, are "excused" as not fairly attributable to the defendant. Abnormal situations, like
abnormal persons, are addressed by special defenses (such as necessity, duress, and entrapment, respectively, in
the above examples) rather than mens rea doctrine. These defenses, and mens rea doctrine itself, reflect what
Professor Peter Arenella has called the "liberal paradigm for moral responsibility." See generally id. at 1516-26.
According to the paradigm, an individual does not deserve moral blame or punishment unless he "made rational
and voluntary choice to engage in behavior that he knew (or more controversially, that he should have known)
would (or might) breach community norms under circumstances that gave him a fair opportunity to avoid the
breach." Id. at 1523.
[Vol. 46:127
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certain offenders deserve as compared to others.
In three different ways, mens rea operates to restrict guilt and punishment
according to moral blameworthiness. First, the identification of a specific mens rea
in the definition of the offense can remove from the ambit of a criminal statute
whole categories of innocent behavior that fall within the actus reus of the crime.
Contrary to Justice Jackson's colorful reference to the actus reus requirement as
mandating an "evil-doing hand,""5 the actus reus of crimes is often not "evil" at all;
indeed, quite often it is entirely consistent with moral, law-abiding behavior.
Consider, for example, the crime of mail fraud. The actus reus of mail fraud is
not defrauding people, but rather using the mails.26 What makes this innocuous
conduct both capable and deserving of criminalization is the illicit purpose for
which the mails are used-namely, to defraud others-and so Congress sensibly
defined the crime as requiring proof that the mails were used "for the purpose of
executing" a "scheme or artifice to defraud."'27 Legislative specification of the
"guilty" purpose or motive necessary for use of the mails to constitute a crime
excises categories of blameless conduct from the scope of mail fraud.
Mail fraud is not exceptional in this regard. Rather, it exemplifies an entire
category of crimes known in common-law terminology as crimes of "specific
intent." Generally speaking, crimes of specific intent prohibit conduct only when
engaged in for some specified bad purpose or objective.2 8 Absent that illicit
purpose or objective, the act often will not be blameworthy, and so the requirement
of specific intent guarantees that any convicted offender will have committed an
act that deserves punishment.
Second, in many crimes, the specific intent requirement promotes proportional-
ity of punishment for blameworthy conduct. In these situations, mens rea matches
up the degree of blameworthiness of the offense with the severity of punishment
authorized by the legislature. This serves to minimize the danger that disproportion-
ate punishment-punishment, in other words, that is either too severe or too
25. See Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (describing crime as a "compound concept" involving the
"concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand").
26. The actus reus of mail fraud is
plac[ing] in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposit[ing] or caus[ing] to be deposited any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or tak[ing]
or receiv[ing] therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly caus[ing] to be delivered by mail
or such carrier... any such matter or thing.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06, at 136 (3d ed. 2001). Common
examples of specific-intent crimes include larceny (which requires intent to steal), attempt (which requires intent
to commit a crime), and conspiracy (which requires intent to commit a crime or to perform a lawful act through
unlawful means). Specific-intent crimes are to be contrasted with "general-intent crimes," which do not require
proof of any particular bad purpose or motive. For an attempt to explain the elusive distinction under common law
between general and specific intent crimes, see id. § 10.06, at 135-37.
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lenient-will be imposed for blameworthy conduct.
Homicide crimes provide a useful illustration. The actus reus of murder (the
unlawful killing of a human being) is undeniably blameworthy whether or not
committed with the specific intent ("malice aforethought") required by the
traditional definition of murder.29 Consequently, defining murder without refer-
ence to malice would not threaten to convict blameless persons. Nevertheless,
legislatures, for good reason, have adhered to the traditional mental element for
murder.3°
The specific intent of "malice aforethought" is the means by which the law
differentiates murder from the less severely punished crime of manslaughter. The
presence or absence of malice has dramatic penal consequences: murder is
potentially punishable by death or life imprisonment in the federal system, but the
maximum penalty for manslaughter, a killing without malice aforethought, is ten
years in prison.3' Murder, therefore, represents a category of specific-intent crimes
in which defining the crime in terms of a particular mental state is essential, not to
exempt blameless conduct from punishment, but rather to achieve proportional
punishment for blameworthy acts.
Notice that the two previously discussed ways in which specific intent serves to
align guilt with blameworthiness are not mutually exclusive. In some crimes,
specific intent will do double duty, exempting blameless acts from criminal
liability and ensuring proportionate punishment for acts that are blameworthy. The
crime of larceny provides an apt example.
To be guilty of larceny, a person must take the property of another with the intent
permanently to deprive the owner of it. This so-called "intent to steal" exempts
from conviction those who innocently take someone else's property. So, for
example, if a defendant takes property in the mistaken belief that it belongs to him,
his mistake of fact disproves the intent to steal required by larceny.32 In addition,
29. "Malice aforethought" has commonly been construed to require either intent to kill or inflict serious bodily
injury, recklessness as to a risk of death so extreme as to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life,
or intent to commit a serious felony during which-the killing occurs. See, e.g., id. § 31.02[B][2], at 503.
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (incorporating "malice aforethought" requirement in definition of
murder). The Model Penal Code does not employ the term "malice aforethought," but, with the exception of the
Code's much-narrower definition of felony murder, closely tracks the familiar common-law categories of murder.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (2001).
31. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (b) (punishments for murder) with 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2006) (punishments for
manslaughter). Even within the separate categories of murder and manslaughter, mens rea is used to differentiate
between different grades of those offenses. For example, "willful, deliberate .... and premeditated" murders are
classified as murder in the first degree, with "[a]ny other murder" constituting second-degree murder only. 18
U.S.C. § 111 l(a). First-degree murder is punishable by a minimum of life imprisonment, and potentially the death
penalty, whereas any term of years, up to a maximum of life, can be imposed for second-degree murder. See 18
U.S.C. § 1111(a)-(b). Similarly, an intentional killing in the heat of passion in response to legally adequate
provocation is punished as voluntary manslaughter, but negligent or reckless killings are classified as involuntary
manslaughter. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). The maximum punishment for voluntary manslaughter is ten years, as com-
pared to the six years that may be imposed for involuntary manslaughter. See 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
32. See DREssLER, supra note 28, § 12.03[C], at 154-55.
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the intent-to-steal requirement operates, in conjunction with "joyriding" statutes,
to promote proportionality of punishment for blameworthy takings of property.
Taking someone else's car for a joyride is blameworthy, but less so than stealing
the car. The operative difference is that joyriding only temporarily dispossesses the
owner of the car, whereas theft involves a dispossession that the taker intends to be
permanent.33 The intent to steal required for larceny thus ensures that joyriders
will not be punished for the more severe crime of theft, but rather of the lesser
offense of joyriding.
Third, in all crimes, mens rea provides a vehicle through which defendants can
show that their actions were blameless given their perception of the operative
facts. If defendants were mistaken as to the facts (and possibly even the law) that
made their conduct morally blameworthy, the mistake can be used to negate the
required mens rea.34 There is also a proportionality function for mistake doctrine
in specific-intent crimes: a defendant who is unreasonably mistaken about a
specific-intent element is guilty of negligence (for failing to use reasonable caution
and prudence in appraising the pertinent facts), but is nonetheless exonerated
because negligence falls below the level of culpability required for intentional
crimes.35
As an example of how mens rea promotes both aspects of innocence-protection-
namely, preventing conviction for blameless conduct and disproportionate punish-
ment for blameworthy conduct-consider Morissette v. United States.36 The
33. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously said of the crime of larceny: "A momentary loss of possession is
not what has been guarded against with such severe penalties. What the law means to prevent is the loss of
[property taken] wholly and forever, as is shown by the fact that it is not larceny to take for a temporary use
without intending to deprive the owner of his property." OLIvER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 71
(1881).
34. Generally speaking, mistakes of facts are valid defenses where, had the facts been as the defendant
reasonably supposed them to be, his conduct would not have been wrongful. The only exception involves
mistakes as to strict-liability elements, which require no mens rea and thus admit of no mistake defenses. See
generally DRESsLER, supra note 28, §§ 12.03-12.05. Apart from strict-liability elements, mistakes of fact can be a
complete defense. The same is true of mistakes of non-criminal law, such as the law determining the validity of
divorces where relevant to bigamy prosecutions. The common law rule is that mistakes of noncriminal law are
admissible to negate specific intent, id. § 13.02[D][1]-[3]; under the Model Penal Code jurisdictions, such mis-
takes, like mistakes of fact, can be used to negate any mens rea requirement with which they are logically
inconsistent. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (2001). Neither the common law nor the Code, however, is
solicitous of mistakes of criminal law. Except in the rare case where the crime makes knowledge of some aspect of
the criminal law an element of the offense, claims of ignorance or mistake of criminal law almost invariably meet
with the reflexive retort that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (2001) (mis-
takes of criminal law no defense); see generally Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (citing
"numerous" applications of the doctrine in federal cases).
35. Even unreasonable mistakes are a defense to specific-intent elements. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202
(noting that individuals who misunderstood their tax obligations cannot be convicted of "willful" violations of the
tax code "whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable"). The common law
rule was different, however, for crimes of general intent. For such crimes, negligent mistakes are not a defense.
See generally DRmssIER, supra note 28, § 12.05, at 136-38 (summarizing the common law's mistake-of-fact
rules).
36. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
defendant took spent bomb casings from an Air Force bombing range in the
mistaken belief that they were abandoned scrap metal when, in fact, they belonged
to the federal government. The taking would have been morally blameless if the
bomb casings were, as he incorrectly assumed, abandoned scrap metal, free to the
first taker. Given that the ownership of the casings was central to the blameworthi-
ness of Morissette's actions, the Supreme Court ruled that he was entitled to
acquittal if, in fact, he was genuinely mistaken.37
That ruling was essential to avoid two distinct threats to innocence-protection
that would have arisen if, as the government contended, mistakes concerning the
ownership of the property were no defense. First, prosecutors would have been
able to brand as felons people whose actions were morally blameless because they
reasonably believed the property they took was abandoned. Second, prosecutors
would be able to visit upon negligent wrongdoers-people who unreasonably
assumed government property was abandoned-serious criminal sanctions, rang-
ing up to ten years in prison, that were intended only for intentional wrongdoers.38
As the above discussion demonstrates, innocence-protection, properly under-
stood, is broader than exempting morally blameless conduct from punishment. It
involves limiting guilt and punishment in accordance with the blameworthiness of
the defendant's act. The means of doing so differs. In some cases, mens rea serves
to carve morally innocent conduct out of the reach of a criminal statute whereas, in
others, it ensures that morally blameworthy conduct will not be punished out of
proportion with its level of blameworthiness; in still others, it does both. The goal,
however, is the same: to ensure that guilt and punishment track the moral
blameworthiness of the conduct that gives rise to liability.
To be faithful to the traditional understanding of innocence-protection, the
Supreme Court should broaden its understanding of what it means for an act to be
"innocent" for purposes of federal mens rea doctrine. Certainly, acts that are en-
tirely free of moral taint qualify as "innocent" and should not be punished.
"Innocence," however, also exists when a prohibited act, though blameworthy, is
insufficiently blameworthy to deserve the penalties authorized by the statute under
which the offender is prosecuted. In that -instance, there is what might be called a
"culpability gap"-a gap between the greater level of moral culpability contem-
plated by Congress and the lesser level manifested in the action of the offender.
That gap, quite simply, is "innocence," no different in principle from the kind of
innocence presented by morally blameless conduct. It is a gap that mens rea
doctrine has traditionally aimed, and must again aim, to close.
37. Id. at 276.
38. In Morissette, the conversion statute explicitly provides that, to be a crime, the conversion of government
property has to be "knowing[]." 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). This was significant to the outcome of the case because,
as the Court noted, it was impossible for Morissette to "have knowingly... converted property that he did not
know could be converted, as would be the case if it was in fact abandoned or if he truly believed it to be abandoned
and unwanted property." Morrissene, 342 U.S. at 271.
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B. Proportionality Through the "Back Door"
Perhaps the best evidence that the Supreme Court's understanding of "inno-
cence" is unduly narrow comes, oddly enough, from the Court itself. As the Court
has recently noted, mens rea doctrine requires "only that mens rea which is necessary
to separate wrongful conduct from 'otherwise innocent conduct.' 39 This is what one
would expect from a doctrine premised upon innocence-protection in the narrow sense:
if innocence-protection simply means limiting punishment to blameworthy acts,
then the mens rea would only be increased only if (and to the extent) necessary to
guarantee some minimal degree of culpability. To the extent minimal blame-
worthiness exists, the conduct is not "innocent," and a doctrine of mens rea that
does not assign independent value to proportionality of punishment would demand
no greater culpability.
As is often the case, however, what the Supreme Court actually does is far more
revealing than what it says. When we look beyond the Court's statements that
mens rea serves only to prevent punishment for blameless conduct, we get a very
different picture. What we find is that the cases support a very different rule-
namely, that the current approach often requires considerably more than minimal
culpability. Proportionality, in short, has been smuggled into the mens rea analysis
(partially, at least) through the back door.
If minimally sufficient culpability were all that the new approach requires, then
negligence or recklessness would be the default mens rea in federal cases. After all,
those are the lowest levels of culpability that are widely accepted as justifying
criminal sanctions. 40 Nevertheless, in each of its recent mens rea cases, the Court
required a substantially more culpable mental state (knowledge) when it detected a
risk that blameless conduct might lead to conviction. These cases show that, in
federal cases, the mens rea requirement often demands high levels of culpability.
Take Staples first. The Court there ruled that it is not a crime to possess an
unregistered machinegun unless the defendant actually knew that his gun could
39. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,269 (2000). Professor John Wiley gives a similar description; he says
that the Court addresses risks that blameless conduct might result in conviction by "formulat[ing] an additional
and minimally sufficient element about mental state to shield blameless conduct from criminal condemnation."
Wiley, supra note 3, at 1023 (emphasis added). He finds implicit in the new approach a "rule against requiring
superfluous culpability," pursuant to which mens rea requirements should only demand "minimally sufficient
culpability." Id. at 1128. For reasons that will soon become clear, it is incorrect to say that mens rea doctrine
requires only the minimal level of culpability necessary to avoid conviction for blameless conduct.
40. See MODEL PEaL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (2001) (recognizing recklessness and negligence as culpable
mental states). The Code defines "negligence" as involving unawareness of risks that are so obvious and so
substantial and unjustifiable in the circumstances as to amount to a "gross deviation from the standard of care"
that a "reasonable person" would have observed. § 2.02(2)(d). Recklessness, by contrast, involves "conscious
disregard" of risks that are so substantial and unjustified as to constitute a "gross deviation from the standard of
conduct" that a "law-abiding person" would have observed in such circumstances. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). Although neg-
ligence is thus regarded as a culpable mental state, the Code drafters chose the higher standard of recklessness as
the default mens rea required for Code offenses. § 2.02(3). The Code also recognizes two higher standards of
culpability; they are, in ascending order, "knowledge" and "purpose." See § 2.02(2)(a)-(b). "
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fire automatically.4 ' The two other cases in the foundational trilogy, Liparota and
Ratzlaf, adopted even stricter mens rea requirements. These cases did not simply
require knowledge of the facts bearing on the legality of the defendant's conduct,
as Staples did; they required proof that the defendants knew the law. Brushing
aside the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," Liparota ruled that
defendants cannot be convicted of misusing food stamps unless they knew that
they were violating applicable food stamp regulations.42 Similarly, the Court ruled
in Ratzlaf that the crime of "structuring" requires proof that the defendant knew it
is illegal to break up a cash transaction involving at least $10,000 in order to avoid
federal currency transaction reporting requirements.43
In each case, the Supreme Court could have easily ruled, if it intended merely to
guarantee some minimal level of culpability, that the defendants could be con-
victed only if they acted unreasonably. This would have meant that Staples would
have been guilty if he should have known of his gun's automatic-firing capability
and that Liparota and Ratzlaf could have been convicted if they should have
known their conduct was illegal. Instead, in each case, the Court construed a stat-
ute silent as to mens rea to require the much higher standard of actual knowledge,
either of the operative facts or of the law itself.
The same dynamic played out in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.44 The
case involved a prosecution for possession and distribution of child pornography.
The court of appeals ruled that the pornography statute did not require knowledge
that the material in question depicted minors performing sex acts, an interpretation
of the statute that the Supreme Court conceded was "[t]he most natural grammati-
cal reading. 45 Nevertheless, the Court deemed that interpretation unacceptable
because it would allow prosecutors to convict blameless defendants (such as de-
livery workers handling packages that, unbeknownst to them, contained child
pornography).46
X-Citement Video is another example of back-door proportionality at work in
federal mens rea selection. The Court adopted a stringent mens rea requirement,
ostensibly for the purpose of exempting blameless acts from punishment, but the
requirement was significantly higher. than necessary to guarantee a minimal level
of blameworthiness. A minimal-culpability standard would have allowed con-
viction as long as the defendant should have known that the material depicted
minors having sex.4 7 Instead, the Court required actual knowledge-a difficult
41. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994).
42. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
43. Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994).
44. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
45. Id. at 68.
46. Id. at 69-73.
47. Arguably, even a less demanding mens rea would have established minimal culpability. The argument
would be that the knowing possession of any pornographic material, whether or not it involves minors, is morally




If the purpose of mens rea is merely to avoid punishment for "innocent"
conduct, the outcome in X-Citement Video is inexplicable. Simply put, it is neither
morally nor "constitutionally" innocent to possess material that any rea-
sonable person would know to be child pornography. Tellingly, the Court did not
premise its "innocence" analysis on the usual ground of moral blamelessness.
Rather than making a moral claim, as it did in its other innocence-protection cases,
the Court relied on "legal innocence," the idea that trafficking in non-obscene
adult pornography is legal (by virtue of the First Amendment) and, in that sense
only, "innocent. 49 The doctrine of "constitutional" (or "legal") innocence merely
required some level of mens rea concerning the age of the performers; it did not
require any particular mens rea, much less the stringent mens rea of actual
knowledge. 50 Any mens rea option other than strict liability for the underage status
of the performers would have solved the constitutional problem, leaving the Court
free to require a mens rea less stringent than knowledge if it wished.
Nevertheless, the otherwise inexplicable outcome in X-Citement Video makes
perfect sense as an effort to promote proportionality of punishment. After all,
trafficking in child pornography is a very serious crime, and it is punished so
severely because the creation of child pornography inflicts serious harms on the
children used to produce it.51 Not surprisingly, the penalties that Congress has
authorized for trafficking in obscene adult pornography pale in comparison to the
Amendment complicates matters. In terms of precedent, adult pornography constitutes protected speech, provided
it is not so vulgar as to be considered "obscene" under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See generally
X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72. The First Amendment itself would seem to require mens rea for the underage
status of a performer in pornographic material to avoid a "chilling effect" on the production and distribution of
constitutionally protected adult pornography. Indeed, the dissenters in X-Citement Video voted to invalidate the
child pornography statute on this basis. See id. at 85-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In light of the First Amendment,
the possession and distribution of non-obscene pornography involving adults is "constitutionally innocent"-
"innocent" not because it is morally licit, but rather because it is constitutionally protected-and thus cannot be
treated as blameworthy by the criminal law. See generally Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARv.
L. REv. 828 (1999) (arguing that strict liability is unconstitutional when the crime, minus the strict-liability
element, constitutes constitutionally protected activity). Some culpability, therefore, was necessary concerning
the age of the performers.
48. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78. The Court ruled that actual knowledge was required "both" as to "the
sexually explicit nature of the material and ... the age of the performers." Id.
49. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
50. As Professor Alan Michaels has explained, with particular reference to X-Citement Video, "[t]he principle
of constitutional innocence... means that strict liability may not be imposed with regard to the use of minors in
the production of [pornographic] materials." Michaels, supra note 47, at 890.
51. In New York v. Ferber, the Court was unequivocal as to the serious "physiological, emotional, and mental"
harms that children used to produce child pornography suffer. 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). Not only are children
sexually exploited in the very creation of child pornography, but the resulting images create a permanent record of
their exploitation which can surface at any time, causing the victims great anxiety and emotional distress. See id.
at 756-59. Because protecting children against sexual exploitation is "of surpassing importance," id. at 757, the
Court ruled that legislatures can "dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties [for the
creation and possession of child pornography]." Id. at 760.
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severe penalties available under federal law for child pornography offenses.52
Limiting conviction to those who actually knew that their pornographic material
featured minors thus serves to guarantee that the conduct that can lead to
conviction for federal child pornography offenses will be sufficiently blameworthy
to deserve the severe penalties available for those offenses.
Given the severity of penalties that were authorized in Staples, Liparota,
Ratzlaf, and X-Citement Video, the Court was absolutely right to insist on more
than "minimal" culpability. Each of these cases involved serious crimes, not minor
infractions. All were classified as felonies, which, as the Court reminds us, "is ...
,as bad a word as you can give to man or thing.' 53 Moreover, the crimes were
punishable by lengthy terms of imprisonment. The maximum prison term was five
years in Liparota and Ratzlaf,5 4 ten years in Staples,55 and twenty years (with a
five-year mandatory minimum) in X-Citement Video.56 For crimes as serious as
these, serious culpability should be required.
An analogy to public-welfare offenses is instructive here. An important ground
for allowing strict liability for those offenses is that their penalties are "relatively
small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.' 5  Al-
though strict liability for public-welfare offenses remains controversial,58 the
argument for it is strongest for minor crimes that are punishable, at most, by short
periods of confinement and that typically result only in fines. After all, such
52. For example, possession of an obscene visual depiction on federal property carries a maximum prison term
of two years, see 18 U.S.C. § 1460(a) (2006), and engaging in the business of distributing obscene matter is
punishable by no more than five years, see § 1466(a). By comparison, the basic penalty for possession or dis-
tribution of child pornography is five to twenty years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(a), 2252A(b)(1) (2006).
53. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952)).
54. See 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2006) (Liparota); 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2006) (Ratzlaf).
55. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871 (2006).
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(a), 2252A(b)(l). The penalty range for convicted sex offenders is much higher still:
fifteen to forty years. See id. For constitutional law purposes, criminal statutes carrying far less severe
punishments are treated as serious crimes. The right to jury trial and the right to counsel are examples. The right to
trial by jury attaches to any crime for which more than six months incarceration is authorized; only crimes
punishable by less than six months can be treated as "petty offenses" as to which there is no constitutional right to
jury trial. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1989) (holding that "petty crimes" are not
subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision). Indigents have an automatic right to appointed counsel in
any felony prosecution, regardless of the penalty the defendant may receive. See Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting that the Constitution requires indigent defendants to be offered appointed coun-
sel in felony cases). Indeed, even for misdemeanors, the possibility of being sentenced to even a day in jail makes
a criminal case important enough to entitle indigent defendants to appointed counsel. See, e.g., Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (arguing that an uncounseled conviction, once a prison sentence is triggered, is
violative of the Sixth Amendment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,40 (1972) (holding that if a misdemeanor
ends with a deprivation of liberty, the accused should have "the guiding hand of counsel").
57. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255. Consistent with this reasoning, the Staples Court adopted an interpretive
presumption against treating felonies as public-welfare offenses. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
618-19 (1994).
58. See generally Michaels, supra note 47, at 831 (noting that "[sitrict liability has endured decades of un-
remitting academic condemnation").
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offenses are more like civil infractions than crimes in terms of their impact on the
defendant.59
By the same logic, severe penalties and high stigma should be available only
where the defendant is seriously at fault. Otherwise, there will be a culpability gap
in which blameworthy conduct may result in disproportionately severe penalties.
Mens rea doctrine should strive to close these culpability gaps by ensuring that
persons subject to conviction for federal crimes will be sufficiently blameworthy
to warrant the penalties to which they would be exposed upon conviction.60 That is
precisely what the Court has been doing in recent mens rea cases under the guise of
exempting blameless conduct from punishment.
To summarize, in cases like Liparota, Staples, and Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court is
saying one thing, but doing something quite different. On the one hand, the Court
says that whether or not heightened mens rea requirements should be adopted for
federal crimes depends on whether, absent such requirements, the crimes could
potentially reach morally blameless conduct. This reflects the view that innocence-
protection, the stated goal of federal mens rea doctrine, is concerned solely with
avoiding punishment for conduct that is entirely blameless.
On the other hand, when the Court perceives a risk that a statute would reach
blameless conduct, it does not simply ratchet up mens rea requirements to a level
sufficient to ensure some minimal level of culpability. That is precisely what the
Court should do if, as it says, its sole concern is exempting blameless conduct from
punishment. What the Court does instead is raise the required mens rea to a level
that is sufficient to ensure that the acts that give rise to criminal liability will be
sufficiently culpable to deserve the available penalties. Thus, although- the Court
never says so explicitly, its most recent mens rea cases reflect an effort to guarantee
not only culpability, but also proportionality of punishment, for individuals subject
to federal criminal prosecution.
Il. MENS REA AND PROPORTIONALITY
The Court's instincts in this regard are correct: mens rea doctrine should aim at
closing culpability gaps in federal criminal law. To the extent a statute would
expose a defendant to punishment that he does not deserve--either because the act
59. Cf United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (noting that public-welfare offenses differ
from traditional crimes in that their "penalties serve as [an] effective means of regulation").
60. This is not to suggest that there is no conceptual upper limit on the level of mental culpability that courts
can require as a precondition to punishment. Innocence-protection, as we have seen, is fundamentally about two
things: avoiding punishment for blameworthy acts and limiting punishment for blameworthy acts in proportion to
their moral culpability. So understood, there is no warrant for courts to require culpability greater than necessary
to ensure blameworthiness and proportionality of punishment. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184
(1998) (adopting a less stringent interpretation of "willful violation" because the more stringent interpretation
favored by the defendant would have hampered law enforcement without any innocence-protection payoff). Thus,
once culpability and proportionality have been guaranteed, the proper demands of innocence-protection are at an
end.
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is entirely blameless or because it is insufficiently blameworthy to warrant the
penalties authorized for it-the defendant is, in that sense, "innocent" and should
not be convicted. Therefore, if protecting "innocence" truly is to be the aim of
mens rea doctrine, the doctrine should treat disproportionate punishment as a
proper concern in its own right, quite apart from punishment for blameless
conduct.
A. The Limits of "Back-Door" Proportionality
One might wonder why it matters whether proportionality comes into the mens
rea analysis through the back door or the front door. Either way, one might argue,
the key point is that proportionality concerns are taken into account despite the
Court's insistence that mens rea serves only to exempt blameless conduct from
punishment. In actuality, however, it matters a great deal whether proportionality
comes in through the front door (as it should) or the back door (as it currently does).
Under the current approach, proportionality concerns are beyond the purview of
mens rea doctrine. This is because the premise of the doctrine is innocence-
protection in the narrow sense of preventing punishment for blameless conduct. If
no blameless conduct would fall within the statute, courts never reach the second,
critically important mens rea selection stage.
This is significant because it is only at the second stage that proportionality
considerations'come in through the back door. If courts get to the mens rea
selection stage, then (and only then) can heightened mens rea requirements be
imposed, and, as in Liparota, Ratzlaf, Staples, and X-Citement Video, courts will
require proof of mens rea sufficient to guarantee both culpability and, coinciden-
tally, proportionality. If, however, there are no potential applications of a statute to
morally blameless conduct, heightened mens rea requirements are categorically
ruled out under the current approach. As a result, the opportunity to use mens rea to
achieve proportionality of punishment is lost.
Evans v. United States61 is a case in point. The case involved a county com-
missioner who accepted payments from an undercover federal agent knowing that
they were given for an official act.62 Because the federal bribery statute63 and other
anti-bribery statutes did not apply, the government charged the commissioner
with extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act. 64 Although
inapplicable, the federal bribery statute was instructive because it uses mens rea
to determine when the receipt of illegal compensation by public officials is merely
a "gratuity" or a "bribe. 65 The distinction has enormous penal consequences: a
gratuity offense is subject to a two-year maximum punishment, as compared to the
61. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
62. Id. at 257.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
64. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).
65. The Supreme Court has explained:
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fifteen-year maximum for bribery.66
In Evans, however, the Court obliterated the careful distinction between bribery
and gratuities. The Court did so by adopting an astonishingly low mens-rea
requirement for extortion under color of right. In order to convict for extortion
under color of official right-a crime punishable by up to twenty years in
prison-the government "need only show that a public official has obtained a
payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in
return for official acts."67 With this holding, the Court exposed gratuity offenses
qua extortion under color of right to punishment well in excess of the two-year
maximum prescribed for such offenses under the bribery statute.
This perverse result reflects the limits of back-door proportionality in mens rea
selection. The minimal mens rea standard adopted in Evans guarantees blamewor-
thiness because public officials will face conviction only if they abused the public
trust to some degree by deriving private gain from public office.6 8 Under these
circumstances, the judicial hands are tied, and courts cannot impose more stringent
mens rea requirements necessary to guarantee proportionality for blameworthy
acts. That limitation leads directly to Evans: the critically important distinction
between gratuities and bribes is erased under the Hobbs Act, with the gratuities that
Congress deemed to be minor crimes being exposed to serious penalties the
bribery statute deems disproportionately severe for mere gratuities as distinct from
outright bribes.
In short, current doctrine is structured in such a way that courts can use mens rea
to solve proportionality problems only if there happens to be an independent
problem of punishing blameless behavior. Even then, proportionality problems are
addressed under the pretense of solving blamelessness problems, without treating
proportionality as a proper consideration in its own right. A myopic focus on
"innocence," narrowly defined, will thus lead courts to miss the danger that crimes
that reach only blameworthy conduct will nonetheless expose persons who engage
in that conduct to disproportionate punishment.
The distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent element. Bribery requires "intent to influence"
or "to be influenced" in an official act, while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given
or accepted "for or because of" an official act. In other words, for bribery there must be a quidpro
quo-a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act. An
illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the
public official will take (and may have already determined to take),or for a past act that he has
already taken.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398,404-05 (1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201).
66. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribery) with 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (gratuity).
67. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.
68. Perhaps only barely so. As Sun-Diamond Growers noted, the mens rea requirement for gratuities offenses
does not prevent prosecution for acceptance of tokens of appreciation that are so trivial as to carry no possibility of
corruption. See 526 U.S. at 411-12.
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B. Proportionality Alternatives
The stakes for mens rea doctrine are high because, as a practical matter, there are
few other safeguards against disproportionate severity in federal punishments. As
presently interpreted, the Constitution offers very little protection in this regard.
Although the Eighth Amendment forbids "grossly disproportionate" penalties,69
the constitutional proportionality principle for noncapital sanctions has largely
proved to be an empty promise. The governing test for proportionality challenges
to sanctions other than death is so stringent that terms of imprisonment other than
life without parole are virtually immune from invalidation on Eighth Amendment
grounds.70
Moreover, sentencing discretion, once a tried-and-true path for federal judges to
show leniency, is quite narrow. Of course, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which have long been criticized for undue rigidity and severity,7" are no longer
legally binding after United States v. Booker.72 Nevertheless, statutory mandatory
minimums-which account for "many of the[] 'horror stories' [in federal sen-
tencing]" 73-remain in place and are commonly invoked by prosecutors to force
district judges to impose severe sentences.7 4
Even when there is no applicable statutory mandatory minimum, the "advisory"
guidelines powerfully constrain sentencing discretion. That is because the "advi-
sory" guidelines system created by Booker exerts significant pressure on district
judges not to impose sentences below the range recommended by the guidelines.7 5
69. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003).
70. See generally Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. Rev. 879, 892-93 (2005).
71. See generally, e.g., KATE STrn & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL CouRTs (1998); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggrega-
tion, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991).
72. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker invalidated the binding federal sentencing guidelines as violative of the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial. The guidelines were invalid because they allowed judicial factfinding to increase
sentences above the guidelines range authorized by jury verdicts of guilty. The Court cured the Sixth Amendment
infirmity by declaring the guidelines "effectively advisory" only. Id. at 245. This meant that, as before the advent
of the guidelines, guilty verdicts expose defendants to any punishment up to the statutory maximum and district
judges are entitled to engage in the factfinding necessary to select appropriate sentences.
73. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal
Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REv. 1017, 1045 (2004).
74. There are more than one hundred statutes in the federal code that impose mandatory minimum sentences,
and those statutes applied in "nearly 60,000 cases" decided between 1984 and 1991. See UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JusTICE SYSTEM
11-12 (1991).
75. Professor Kate Stith explains:
There are still powerful forces arrayed against the exercise of sentencing discretion by district
judges responsive to local concerns, the particular facts of the case at hand, and the advocacy of the
parties. As a formal matter, courts of appeals may still second-guess judges whose sentences are
found to be an "unreasonable" application of the broad statutory sentencing criteria that are the
lodestar of sentencing law after Booker.... Most importantly, the Guidelines remain the starting
point for all sentences, with an anchoring effect made all the more powerful by [the Supreme
Court's] go-ahead to the courts of appeals to treat Guidelines sentences as presumptively
2009] PROPORTIONAL MENS REA
Not surprisingly, even after the guidelines were declared to be "advisory," a mere
12.1% of defendants succeeded in getting below-guidelines sentences over the
prosecution's objection.76 In a sentencing regime in which judges are so reluctant
to grant unilateral exercises of leniency, the interpretation of federal crimes is, as a
practical matter, the only sure avenue left open to the courts to promote proportion-
ality of punishment.
Under these circumstances, mens rea selection can make a meaningful contribu-
tion to the achievement of sentencing proportionality. Narrowly construing the
actus reus of federal crimes could be an effective way of reducing risks of
disproportionate punishment in the federal system.77 The problem is that courts
repeatedly-and almost reflexively-succumb to the temptation to expand the
reach of federal crimes when culpable conduct is at stake, even when doing so
significantly drives up the maximum punishment for a criminal act. 78 As long as
courts continue to do so, mens rea requirements will be the best hope for redressing
the potential for disproportionate criminal penalties in the federal system.
C. The Need for "Front-Door" Proportionality
It is time to bring proportionality considerations in through the front door by
explicitly incorporating them into federal mens rea analysis. There are both
theoretical and pragmatic reasons for doing so. These reasons are developed, in
turn, below.
reasonable. The Guidelines are now the frame, in both law and practice, in which sentences are
viewed.
Kate Stith, The Arc of the Penduluum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420,
1496 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
76. U.S. SENTNCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, 3RD QUARTER RELEASE tbl. 1(2007),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/Quarter_Report -3rd -07.pdf. Overall, almost two-thirds (61.2%) of
defendants sentenced after Booker received sentences within the guidelines range, and most of the sentences
below the guidelines range were sought by the prosecution as a reward for assistance by the defendant in pursuing
other offenders. Id.
77. A familiar historical example involves the Mann Act, otherwise known as the "White Slave Traffic Act,"
Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006)). The Act made it a
crime to transport a female in interstate commerce for purposes of "prostitution or debauchery, or for any other
immoral purpose." Id. The catch-all phrase ("any other immoral purpose") could be read narrowly (as, say, limited
to commercialized vice) or broadly (as reaching sex outside of marriage and any other sex deemed immoral). This
interpretive choice, which was presented in Carinetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), had dramatic im-
plications for the punishment available for extramarital sex in federal court. The Mann Act's five-year maximum
was harsher than the punishments available in most states at the time for adultery and fornication and, oddly
enough, under the congressional statutes that specifically prohibited adultery and fornication on federal lands. See
generally Smith, supra note 70, at 897-903 (discussing the proportionality implications of Caminetti). A narrow
interpretation of the catch-all phrase that excluded extramarital sex from the Mann Act would thus have prevented
disproportionate punishment for that conduct.
78. See generally Smith, supra note 70, at 893-930. Caminetti is a prime example. The Court construed a
statute aimed at "white slavery" broadly as encompassing the transportation of willing females across state lines
for extramarital sex. 242 U.S. at 484-86. The Court's desire to allow prosecutors to reach culpable conduct
evidently blinded it to the fact that its interpretation significantly increased the penalty for adultery and fornication.
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1. Theoretical Considerations
As a matter of theory, disproportionately severe punishment offends notions of
justice and sound criminal justice policy just as punishment of morally blameless
conduct does. In both contexts, punishment is being imposed that the offender does
not deserve.79 Even if punishment for a blameless act is viewed as a greater
injustice than excessive punishment for a blameworthy act, the distinction is one of
degree, not of kind; both circumstances involve the same type of injustice-
namely, punishment that is not morally deserved. For that reason, Anglo-American
legislatures and courts have historically used mens rea to ensure that, in the event
of conviction, the available punishment will "fit" the crime. 80 This is exactly how
it should be in a legal system, such as ours, that aspires to limit criminal pun-
ishment in accordance with moral blameworthiness.
It is important to note that the linkage between punishment and blameworthi-
ness is no mere artifact from a bygone retributivist age. Although utilitarians reject
the retributivist notion that moral blameworthiness is the justification for punish-
ment,81 they agree that blameworthiness must be accounted for in a utilitarian
criminal justice system. For example, although Herbert Packer, the noted criminal
law scholar, dismissed the retributivist justification for punishment as having
"Pollyanna-ish overtones,"82 he endorsed moral blameworthiness as an "important
limiting principle" for criminal punishment.83 The fundamental insight here, rec-
ognized by Packer and most modem utilitarians, is that there is considerable
"utility" in moral "desert"-that a criminal law which distributes punishment ac-
cording to moral blameworthiness will more effectively achieve its crime-
prevention goals than one which punishes without regard to community moral
79. Indeed, it is possible to think of avoiding punishment for blameless acts as simply an application of the
broader principle that punishment must be proportional to the blameworthiness of the offense committed. Where
the defendant's conduct is blameless, the only proportional punishment is zero.
80. See supra Part l.A.
81. Compare, e.g., MJcHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMiNAL LAW 91 (1997)
("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because and only
because offenders deserve it. Moral responsibility ('desert') in such a view is not only necessary for justified
punishment, it is also sufficient.") with 1 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BNrHm 83 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ("All punishment being in itself
evil, upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil."). H.L.A. Hart stated the utilitarian credo with characteristic pithiness: the
law "punish[es] men not as wicked but as nuisances." H.L.A. HART, PtNisHmENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OFLAW 181 (1968).
82. HERBERT L. PAcKER, THE LamS OF a CRIMINAL SANCTION 66-67 (1968).
83. Id. Packer was far from alone in this regard. As no less an authority than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
declared, "a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the
community would be too severe for that community to bear." HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 50. Similarly, Hart agreed
that the law should heed "principles of justice" calling for reduced punishment in particular situations. HART,
supra note 81, at 24. Hart also contended that the "guiding principle," both for legislatures in defining crimes and
judges in sentencing defendants, should be "proportion," meaning "very broad judgments both of the relative




In a system that thus employs moral blameworthiness as a limit on punishment,
the only plausible ground for excluding proportionality considerations from mens
rea analysis would be that proportionality represents an unmanageable standard of
judicial decisionmaking. The argument would be that it is too difficult for courts to
make principled determinations of when punishment does, and does not, "fit" the
85 icrime. Even in a system that would otherwise embrace proportionality as a
limiting principle, the absence of judicially manageable standards could be a valid
reason for excluding proportionality concerns from the mens rea analysis.
The short answer to this argument is that the law does not regard proportionality
as an unmanageable standard. Even though proportionality unquestionably defies
precise definition, it has long determined the proper amount of punishment to
impose for a criminal act. Proportionality is a standard routinely applied by courts
no less than legislatures. Even after legislators grade offenses and prescribe the
range of punishments that a crime could warrant, it is left for judges to select, from
the range of legislatively authorized punishments, the sentence that "fits" on the
facts of particular cases. That, obviously, is a proportionality inquiry.86 Moreover,
courts use proportionality as the standard determining the constitutionality both of
legislatively authorized penalties and, in the civil context, of punitive damages
84. Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley nicely explain the utility of limiting punishment in accordance
with moral blameworthiness. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv.
453 (1997). In their view, "every deviation from a desert distribution can incrementally undercut the criminal
law's moral credibility, which in turn can undercut its ability to help in the creation and internalization of [social]
norms and its power to gain compliance by its moral authority." Id at 478; see generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) (reporting results of study finding that people "obey[] the law if it is legitimate
and moral"). Robinson and Darley conclude that, to have moral credibility in the eyes of the public, the criminal
law "ought to adopt rules that distribute liability and punishment according to desert, even if a non-desert dis-
tribution appears in the short run to offer the possibility of reducing crime." Robinson & Darley, supra, at 477-78.
85. Justice Antonin Scalia leveled this sort of objection against constitutional proportionality analysis in
Harmelin v. Michigan:
The real function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to enable judges to
evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women has considered proportionate-and to
say that it is not. For that real-world enterprise, the standards seem so inadequate that the pro-
portionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values.
501 U.S. 957, 986 (1991) (plurality opinion).
86. As a leading account of sentencing reform notes, apart from the era of binding sentencing guidelines, "[iln
exercising the wide sentencing discretion assigned by Congress, a federal judge's task has been to allocate
punishment fairly for each crime and each criminal who comes before the court"-a determination made
according to the "idea of proportionality in sentencing." STrrH & CABRANrs, supra note 73, at 14. Even during the
nation's now-ended experiment with binding federal sentencing guidelines, proportionate sentencing was still the
goal; what changed was the means by which the goal was to be achieved. The binding guidelines replaced wide
judicial discretion with precise guidelines telling judges precisely what factors are relevant to sentencing and
the precise weight to give to those factors. See generally id. at 78-103 (contrasting pre- and post-guidelines
sentencing).
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awards.8 7 Given that proportionality is regarded as a judicially manageable
standard (and, indeed, manageable enough to serve as a constitutional limit on
legislative power), the use of proportionality merely as a factor influencing the
interpretation of mens rea requirements in federal criminal statutes-which Con-
gress is free to revisit if it so chooseSa-seems entirely unproblematic.
A potential counterargument concerns the proper judicial role. In its most
defensible form, the argument would be that, with the exception of constitutionally
mandated judicial proportionality review, it is the sole province of legislatures to
determine whether or not a sanction is proportional to a criminal act. The argument
proceeds from a sound premise-the centrality of proportionality to the criminal
law-but reaches an incorrect conclusion about the judicial role.
Properly understood, the judicial role is broad enough to encompass adjusting
mens rea requirements in order to promote proportionality of punishment. The
definition of the mens rea requirements for federal crimes is an exercise of
statutory construction, a core function of the judicial branch.89 Building on the
emphasis in Morissette v. United States9° on using mens rea to limit punishment
according to moral blameworthiness, modern mens rea cases, beginning with
Liparota v. United States,91 have essentially required judges to apply an "unwritten
moral code" in determining whether or not conduct that falls within the literal
scope of a criminal statute is blameworthy.92 If it is proper for courts to adjust
mens rea requirements based on judicial judgments about of whether or not an act
87. See Smith, supra note 70, at 891. In making proportionality determinations for these constitutional
purposes, courts are properly guided by objective indicia of how the authorized punishment compares with the
crime of conviction. Two of the most pertinent indicia in this regard are the penalties authorized for other crimes
in the same jurisdiction and for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292
(1984) (describing criteria that should guide a court's proportionality analysis).
88. Congress quickly exercised its prerogative in this regard in the wake of Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S.
135 (1994). At the urging of the Justice Department, Congress enacted a new crime punishing "structuring" cash
transactions worth $10,000 or more into smaller transactions in order to avoid federal currency transaction
reporting requirements. The new law omitted the original crime's "willfulness" requirement, which Ratzlafhad
interpreted as making ignorance of the law a defense. See Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(d) (2006)). As the rapid demise of Ratzlaf shows,
Congress is willing and able to override heightened mens rea requirements when it thinks the courts have
undermined an important law-enforcement tool.
89. See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating that "we have long recognized
that determining the mental state required for commission of a federal crime requires 'construction of the statute"'
(quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922))).
90. 342 U.S. 246 (1956).
91. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
92. Wiley, supra note 3, at 1046. Although they have disagreed over the application of mens rea doctrine in
particular cases, the Justices agree that heightened mens rea requirements can and should be used to avoid the
possibility of conviction for morally blameless conduct. This approach to mens rea selection has commanded
support from such polar opposites as Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, all of whom have authored major opinions adjusting mens rea requirements in light of culpability con-
cerns. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Bryan v. United
States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (Stevens, J.); Ratzla 510 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J.); Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J.).
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is morally blameworthy (and scholars and Justices agree that it is), 9 3 courts can
also take into account proportionality concerns in deciding mens rea questions.
After all, it is artificial (if not illogical) to sever culpability and proportionality
concerns from one another; they are interrelated aspects of the same normative
imperative that punishment should be distributed in accordance with moral desert.
Pragmatically speaking, it should not be too difficult for courts to determine
whether a sanction is disproportionate and thus improper absent heightened mens
rea requirements. As with constitutional proportionality challenges to criminal
sanctions, judges can consult other federal and state criminal statutes as objective,
democratically legitimate benchmarks against which to determine whether a
criminal sanction is proportional or not; thus proportionality analysis need not be
entirely subjective and ad hoc. Indeed, proportionality may well be more-not
less-manageable than culpability as a standard to guide the interpretation of mens
rea requirements. At least there are objective benchmarks to-guide the proportion-
ality inquiry; under the culpability approach to mens rea selection, however, such
benchmarks are lacking, and courts decide for themselves, without any legislative
guidance, whether acts that fall within the literal reach of a federal criminal statute
are morally blameworthy or not.94 Be that as it may, unless one is prepared to
jettison the culpability approach to mens and require courts to treat legislative
silence as to mens rea as signaling strict liability-which, to say the least, would
produce draconian results-there is no good reason to allow courts to consider
culpability, but not proportionality, as a factor influencing mens rea selection.
2. Pragmatic Considerations
The case for explicitly factoring proportionality considerations into mens rea
selection is not theoretical only. As a practical matter, federal mens rea doctrine
will be more consequential, and federal criminal law as a whole will operate better,
if the mens rea requirement is allowed to serve its traditional, salutary role of
ensuring that serious criminal penalties will only be available in federal court for
seriously culpable conduct.
The Supreme Court's current methodology will have little impact as long as it
remains focused solely on preventing punishment for morally blameless conduct.
That is because of prosecutorial discretion. Even if a crime has definitely been
committed, prosecutors are under no obligation to file criminal charges.
Although exercises of prosecutorial discretion depend on a broad array of
93. See sources cited supra note 3. For an extensive argument that the culpability-based approach to mens rea
accords with the proper judicial role, see Wiley, supra note 3, at 1068-78.
94. As one supporter has explained, the culpability approach to mens rea selection necessarily rests on courts'
"internal moral intuitions": "The question of whether conduct is 'apparently innocent' usually cannot be answered'
by direct reference to congressional sources because the meaning of the legislative authority-the statute and its
history-is the very issue for decision." Wiley, supra note 3, at 1071.
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factors whose weight varies from case to case,95 one constant is that prosecutors
acting in good faith have strong incentives not to prosecute blameless individuals.
Apart from cases of actual innocence, there would be no more sympathetic a
defendant than an individual who is prosecuted for acts that any well-intentioned,
law-abiding citizen would have performed in similar circumstances. As any
prosecutor knows, charging sympathetic defendants with serious crimes carries
unacceptable risks that the jury will be unable to reach a verdict or, in extreme
cases, will nullify the charges outright. 96 Consequently, barring some sort of
impermissible motivation (which, of course, is subject to constitutional regulation
in its own right),97 prosecutors have no incentive to charge defendants who truly
are blameless.
98
Thinking about the current approach to mens rea in light of prosecutorial
discretion reveals what is really at stake in cases like Liparota, Staples, and
Ratzlaf. In imposing heightened mens rea requirements, the Supreme Court
repeatedly speaks of the need to counteract the possibility that morally blameless,
or "innocent," conduct might lead to a criminal conviction, as if to suggest that the
Department of Justice would knowingly prosecute morally blameless people. 99
These statements, however, cannot be taken literally given how prosecutors
behave.
95. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (listing factors that prosecutors consider
when determining whether to prosecute).
96. See, e.g., Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National
C.enterfor State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CnI.-KENrr L. REv. 1249, 1276 (2003) (reporting results of study
finding that "juror concerns about legal fairness and outcome fairness are present to a measurable extent in hung
and acquittal juries").
97. The main constitutional limits on bad-faith charging decisions are the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. Equal protection forbids "selective prosecution," which occurs when prosecutors charge suspects based
on race or other suspect classifications. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (clarifying
the elements required to establish selective prosecution based on race). Due process prohibits prosecutors from
making arbitrary or vindictive charging decisions, the latter being charging decisions intended to punish suspects
for exercising constitutional or statutory rights. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (rejecting vindictiveness claim
by vocal pacifist who refused to register for the Selective Service).
98. The recent mens rea cases illustrate the point. Although the Supreme Court feared that innocent defendants
could be convicted absent heightened mens rea requirements, those fears were not based on real-world
prosecutions. Rather, the Court resorted to imaginative hypotheticals to demonstrate that blameless defendants
could be convicted. See generally Wiley, supra note 3, at 1044-46 (explaining that the examples of "innocence"
cited in the mens rea cases were "all about outermost applications and not about usual or actual cases"). The
exclusive reliance on hypothetical cases of innocence suggests that, in each of the real-world prosecutions that
faced the Court, the prosecution had successfully identified morally blameworthy suspects.
99. In one commentator's view, the mens rea cases suggest that the Supreme Court views prosecutors "as
threats to, rather than bulwarks of, justice." Wiley, supra note 3, at 1043. This view, however, is mistaken. Even
though the Supreme Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined when possible in terms that prevent
conviction for morally blameless conduct, current mens rea doctrine in no way questions the professionalism and
integrity of federal prosecutors. The point of the recent mens rea cases is not that prosecutors cannot be trusted to
be fair (or, worse still, that prosecutors can be trusted to be unfair). It is, rather, that judicially enforceable safe-
guards against conviction for morally blameless conduct have an important role to play, along with prosecutorial
discretion, in ensuring the just disposition of criminal cases.
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In exercising their charging discretion, prosecutors are looking, first and
foremost, for blameworthiness. They are trying to identify offenders who deserve
to be publicly branded as criminals and punished. Prosecutors gain nothing and
risk much if they invest scarce resources in the prosecution of morally blameless
individuals, the kind of defendants likely to evoke sympathy from jurors, judges,
and the public at large. Thus, if the purpose of Liparota and its progeny is merely to
prevent prosecutors from using federal criminal law, in effect, to persecute morally
blameless people, it is unnecessary.
In fact, cases like Liparota serve a more fundamental purpose. The operative
concern is not that prosecutors will make bad-faith charging decisions, but rather
that prosecutors, acting entirely in good faith, may make mistakes in determining
blameworthiness. The potential for error flows from the substantively unbounded
and procedurally informal nature of prosecutorial charging decisions.
Charging decisions are substantively unbounded in the sense that they need not
be (and often are not) made solely on the basis of the conduct that constitutes the
charged offense. Other information about the suspect, including character informa-
tion and suspicion of other criminal activity, often weighs heavily in the charging
decision, whether or not such information would be admissible at trial. 1°° More-
over, once the prosecutor's office identifies and assembles the information deemed
relevant, the case is processed, and the charging decision reached, through a highly
informal, and largely ex parte, adjudicative procedure that lacks the safeguards of
accuracy and reliability that characterize criminal trials.1 ' These features of the
charging decision, in combination, create risks that the prosecutor's determination
of blameworthiness may be erroneous. The prosecutor, for example, may overlook
relevant evidence that explains or justifies conduct that seems, on its face, to be
"guilty" (such as motive or state-of-mind evidence that can only come from the
defendant), give undue weight to input .from law-enforcement agents, or, as in the
paradigmatic case of pretextual prosecution, act on the basis of suspicions of other
criminal activity that cannot be proven.
In two ways, reading heightened mens rea requirements into crimes when
100. As former U.S. Attorney Harry Litman has written:
Many decisions to prosecute federally are based not on the facts of the charged offense but rather
on other conduct or characteristics of the defendant. Call it the "Al Capone approach to federal
prosecution" after its most celebrated instance, the 1932 prosecution on federal tax evasion
charges of the colorful Chicago mobster who had long evaded prison for his notorious crimes.
Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2004). For an interesting argument that
pretextual prosecutions are particularly prevalent at the federal level, see Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz,
Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583,
599-618 (2005).
101. The classic exposition of these points is Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDAM L. REv. 2117 (1998). These missing procedural safeguards include adversarial presentation of
evidence and cross-examination, evidentiary rules barring the use of unreliable or unfairly prejudicial evidence,
and the requirement that all reasonable doubts be resolved in the suspect's favor. Id. at 2127-28.
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necessary to exclude morally innocent behavior helps ensure that there will be an
accurate and reliable determination of blameworthiness in every litigated case.
First, it narrows the information prosecutors can use to prove blameworthiness.
Second, it brings the accuracy-enhancing safeguards of the judicial process to bear
on the determination of blameworthiness.
In a regime of incomplete crime definition such as ours-where crimes, as
legislatively defined, are not necessarily "inevitably nefarious" 11 2 and thus could
be committed by law-abiding persons-trials will not necessarily establish that the
defendant deserves blame. To the extent mens rea doctrine succeeds in its objective
of incorporating all elements essential to the blameworthiness of a crime into the
definition of the offense, proof of legal guilt will entail proof, beyond any rea-
sonable doubt, of moral blameworthiness. Unlike the prosecutor's charging
decision, the determination of moral blameworthiness at trial will be made by a
neutral decisionmaker (the factfinder) after full-bl6wn judicial process, with
opportunity for proof and counterproof from the defendant. Furthermore, the
factfinder's determination will be reached on the sole basis of evidence deemed
reliable enough to be admissible in court, and the evidence will normally bear
solely on the charged crime (as opposed to unproven allegations of other criminal
activity), 10 3 with any and all reasonable doubts resolved in the defendant's favor.
In these ways, mens rea doctrine serves to counteract the danger that the informal
and unbounded nature of prosecutorial deliberations will lead prosecutors acting in
good faith to charge morally blameless individuals.
Accordingly, there is value in the current approach to mens rea even if, as is
surely the case, few prosecutors would knowingly prosecute morally blameless
people. The impact of the current approach, however, will be open to question as
long as mens rea doctrine remains limited to ensuring blameworthiness of the part
of federal convicts. Because prosecutors acting in good faith will not be oblivious
to moral innocence, current doctrine will either serve as a minimal check against
bad-faith charging decisions by rogue prosecutors or as a more robust safeguard
against good-faith but mistaken prosecutorial determinations of blameworthiness.
The impact of current doctrine thus depends on how frequently prosecutors ignore,
or simply miss, moral innocence.
Nevertheless, the impact of mens rea doctrine will be undeniable and real if
pressed into service for proportionality of punishment. Of the wide array of
critiques that have been leveled against federal criminal law in recent decades, one
of the most consistent is that it frequently produces disproportionately severe sen-
tences. Especially in the frequently prosecuted area of drug and firearms offenses
(which account for roughly half of all federal prosecutions), federal mandatory
102. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
103. With "enterprise" crimes, such as RICO, proof of other crimes by the defendant and his associates is
essential in order to establish liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006) (making the commission of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" a necessary element of a RICO charge).
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minimum sentences sometime equal or exceed the maximum punishment that
would be available in some states for parallel offenses.1 " The phenomenon of
higher federal sentences is not limited to drug-related offenses, however. The
now-"advisory" federal sentencing guidelines, which apply to all federal crimes,
routinely generate sentences that are severe "as compared to state sentences for
similar conduct, pre-guidelines federal sentences, and sentences in most other
countries for similar crimes."
1 0 5
Once it is understood that a major problem for federal criminal law is
disproportionate penal severity, the case for incorporating proportionality consid-
erations into federal mens rea analysis becomes even more compelling. Whereas
federal prosecutors specifically look for blameworthiness in deciding whether or
not to file charges, they are required by Department of Justice policy to ignore
proportionality considerations in cases in which charges are filed. For decades,
under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, it has been departmental
policy that, in the event of federal prosecution, prosecutors will charge and seek
conviction on the offense that will generate the highest sentence. 10 6 To the extent
they follow this unyielding mandate from Washington (which seems likely),10 7
line prosecutors will not charge only lesser offenses or charge all applicable
offenses and then dismiss or bargain away offenses that are disproportionally severe.
Instead, prosecutors will continue to act as sentence-maximizers at the charging stage.
The sentence-maximizing posture mandated by Washington at the pretrial stage
104. See generally Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643, 674 (1997) (describing aspects of federal sentencing that make federal prosecution less favorable to
defendants than state prosecution). According to another commentator, federal drug offenses often result in
sentences that are "ten or even twenty times higher" than the sentences that would be imposed in state court for the
same conduct. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HAsTNos L.J. 979, 998-99 (1995). Even advocates of tough criminal sentences
have criticized mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 73.
105. Stith, supra note 75, at 1449.
106. See Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing 2 (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
Aschcroft Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2003/September/03.ag_516.htm. This Memo-
randum declares it to be "the policy of the Department of Justice that, in all federal criminal cases, federal
prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by
the facts of the case." Id. The "most serious offense or offenses," the Memorandum continues, "are those that
generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, unless a mandatory minimum sentence or
count requiring a consecutive sentence would generate a longer sentence." Id. The mandate that federal
prosecutors actively pursue the highest available sentence is not just the policy of the George W. Bush
administration; it was a "central requirement" of the two preceding administrations as well. See Stith, supra note
75, at 1469 (citing earlier departmental memoranda).
107. Efforts have long been underway in the Justice Department to centralize control over enforcement
decisions made by prosecutors in the field, with the Bush administration's firing of several U.S. Attorneys being
but the latest (and most controversial) example. See generally Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The
Supreme Court Holds-The Center Doesn't, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1378-85 (2008) (discussing efforts of recent
administrations to exert greater control over field-level enforcement decisions). To be fair, Professor Richman
doubts the long-term efficacy, as well as the wisdom, of such efforts to reverse the decentralization of federal
enforcement decisionmaking. See id. at 1403-11.
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might be acceptable if federal prosecutors retained latitude to grant or allow
leniency at the sentencing stage. Unfortunately, longstanding Justice Department
policy also requires prosecutors to seek the maximum supportable penalty under
the guidelines. For example, prosecutors "must disclose" to the judge's attention at
sentencing all factors that would result in increased punishment under the federal
sentencing guidelines and cannot do anything that would "result[] in the sentenc-
ing court having less than a full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant
to sentencing."10
8
Even though the guidelines are no longer legally binding after Booker, federal
prosecutors are required to act, in effect, as if they still are law. Prosecutors have
been instructed to continue the pre-Booker practice of opposing, both in the district
courts and on appeal, unilateral efforts by judges to impose sentences below the
applicable guidelines range.10 9 As Professor Kate Stith has explained, current
Justice Department policies "put[] the prosecutor in the position not of upholding
the law, but of opposing in all circumstances the exercise of lawful discretionary
decisions of the sentencing judge[,]" and to do so "even when Guidelines sen-
tences would clearly disserve the statutory purposes invoked by Booker."11 Thus,
federal prosecutors are categorically barred from taking proportionality into
account in pending cases and must, from start to finish, pursue the highest
supportable sentence under the guidelines given the law and facts of particular
cases.
These Department of Justice policies requiring prosecutors always to seek the
maximum supportable penalty under the guidelines, regardless of the equities of
particular cases, suggest that mens rea doctrine has matters precisely backwards.
The current method of judicial mens rea selection is designed to solve a culpability
problem (punishment without blameworthiness) that rarely, if ever, materializes
and will usually be addressed by sound exercises of prosecutorial discretion. It
ignores, however, a related culpability problem (punishment in excess of blamewor-
thiness) that not only is endemic to federal criminal practice, but is also routinely
exploited by federal prosecutors to generate sentences that are, by any realistic
108. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 106, at 3.
109. Under the "Comey Memorandum," prosecutors "must actively seek sentences within the range estab-
lished by the Sentencing Commission in all but extraordinary cases ... involving circumstances that were not
contemplated by the Sentencing Commission." Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. James B. Comey to All
Federal Prosecutors 2 (Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Comey Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
iln/osc/documents/ag-memo-august 12_2005.pdf. The Memorandum further instructs that
in any case in which the sentence imposed is below what the United States believes is the
appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range (except uncontested departures pursuant to the Guide-
lines, with supervisory approval), federal prosecutors must oppose the sentence and ensure the
record is sufficiently developed to place the United States in the best position possible on appeal.
I
110. Stith, supra note 75, at 1484 (emphasis added). The statutory purposes referred to in the text can be sum-
marized as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
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measure, severe. The only way to bring rationality to this area, and to help restore a
greater sense of moral legitimacy to federal criminal law, is to recognize excessive
punishment as a proper concern of federal mens rea doctrine.
CONCLUSION
After two decades of mens rea jurisprudence designed to achieve innocence-
protection, the Supreme Court, ironically enough, still does not fully appreciate
what "innocence" is. What the Court fails to realize, and must realize if the goals of
mens rea doctrine are to be fully achieved, is that "innocence" also incorporates
.considerations of proportionality. Commission of a blameworthy act is merely the
first of two culpability-related inquiries; it is also necessary to ask whether the
defendant's act was sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the penalties afforded by
the statute in question. If the conduct was only minimally blameworthy, severe
penalties would constitute disproportionate punishment. "Innocence" will never be
fully protected until courts recognize that mens rea must, to the maximum extent
possible, guarantee both culpability and proportionality for every potential federal
defendant-until, in other words, disproportional mens rea finally becomes propor-
tional mens rea.
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